

PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (224)
Graduate Course—Winter 2003
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This course will be an advanced introduction to contemporary issues in the philosophy of language. We will be concerned primarily with the nature of meaning and of reference. This course is taught in conjunction with an upper-level undergraduate philosophy of language course. Graduate students will read the papers assigned to undergraduates (marked with ‘@’ below), plus Saul Kripke’s *Naming and Necessity* and additional papers to be assigned.

Graduate students should attend the scheduled course lectures. To receive course credit, you will also be required to attend a separate fortnightly session that will function much as a reading group would function. During these fortnightly sections, we will discuss Kripke’s *Naming and Necessity*, and related papers.

Your written work will consist in two papers, each roughly 10 pages in length. Each paper will take off from topics discussed in class or in the discussion session, and should draw on further research. To receive graduate credit, these papers will normally undergo more than one draft.

The texts for the course are A.P. Martinich, *Philosophy of Language* (4th ed) [M], and Devitt and Sterelny, *Language and Reality* (2nd ed) [D&S]. Both available at Literary Guillotine. Most required readings are from these two books. You will also need access to Kripke’s *Naming and Necessity*. Readings from these and all other sources will be made available for copying.

Below is a list of required readings (@), as well as some supplemental readings, arranged by topic. ‘*’ denotes suggested or further reading particularly worthy of attention. Advanced readings are marked with ‘+’.

1 Meaning and Reference

1.1 The “Fido”-Fido Theory of Meaning

- @ Mill, “Of Names” [M]
- @ Devitt and Sterelny, *Language and Reality* [D&S], ch. 1.

1.2 Sense and Reference

- @ Frege, “On Sense and Reference”
- @ Devitt and Sterelny, *Language and Reality* [D&S], chs.1 and 2
 - Kenny, *Frege*
 - Dummett, *Frege: Philosophy of Language*, esp. chs. 5 and 6 (+)

1.3 Names and Descriptions

- @ Russell, “Descriptions”
- @ D&S, ch.2 (esp. 2.5–2.7), ch.3
 - * Strawson, “On Referring”
 - * Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions”
 - D&S, 5.7
 - * Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, Lecture I
 - * Neale, *Descriptions* (+)
 - Nelson, “Russelling the Referential” (+)

1.4 Causal Theory of Names

- @ Kripke, “Naming and Necessity”
- @ D&S, ch.4
 - * Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, Lecture II
 - Soames, *Beyond Rigidity*, chs. 1, 2, 3 (+)
 - * Evans, *The Varieties of Reference* (+)

1.5 Natural Kind Terms

- @ Putnam, “Meaning and Reference”
- * Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”.
- * Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, Lecture III
 - Soames, *Beyond Rigidity*, chs. 9, 10, 11 (+)

1.6 Defending Descriptivism

- @ Searle, “Proper Names and Intentionality”
- @ Devitt, “Meanings Just Ain’t in the Head”
- @ D&S, ch.5
 - Searle, “Proper Names”
 - Evans, “The Causal Theory of Names”
 - Kroon, “Causal Descriptivism” (+)
 - Jackson, “Reference and Descriptivism Revisited”

2 The Basis of Meaning

2.1 Tarski’s Theory of Truth

- @ Tarski, “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics”
- @ Tarski, “Truth and Proof”
- * Tarski, “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages” (+)
- Field, “Tarski’s Theory of Truth” (+)

2.2 Truth and Meaning

- @ Davidson, “Truth and Meaning”
- @ D&S, 2.1–2.4 and 15.4–15.5
- * Foster, “Meaning and Truth Theory” (+)
- Soames, “Truth, Meaning, and Understanding” (+)
- Strawson, “Meaning and Truth”

2.3 Speaker’s Meaning and Literal Meaning

- @ Grice, “Meaning”
- @ D&S, 7.4–7.6
 - Grice, “Logic and Conversation”
 - Schiffer, *Meaning*
 - Nelson, *Using Words: Pragmatic Implications and Semantic Contents* (+)

2.4 Convention

- @ Lewis, “Languages and Language”
 - Lewis, *Convention: A Philosophical Study*
 - * Plato, *Cratylus*

3 Further Topics

3.1 Demonstratives

- * Kaplan, “Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals”
- Kaplan, “Dthat”
- Evans, “Understanding Demonstratives”
- Almog, Perry, Wettstein, *Themes from Kaplan* (+)

3.2 Semantics of Propositional Attitude Ascriptions

- Quine, “Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes”
- * Kripke, “A Puzzle About Belief”
- Perry and Crimmins, “The Prince and the Phonebooth”
- Schiffer, “Belief Ascription”
- Salmon, *Frege’s Puzzle*
- Salmon and Soames, *Propositions and Attitudes* (+)
- Richard, *Propositional Attitudes* (+)
- Soames, *Beyond Rigidity*, chs. 6, 7, 8 (+)

3.3 Mental Content

- * Burge, “Individualism and the Mental”
- * Loar, “Social Content and Psychological Content”
- Loar, *Mind and Meaning*
- Stalnaker, “Narrow Content”

- Fodor, “Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation”
- Lewis, “Reduction of Mind”
- Chalmers, “The Components of Content”
- (+)

3.4 General

- * Wittgenstein, *Tractatus* (1922), and *Philosophical Investigations* (1953)
- * Ayer, *Language, Truth, and Logic* (1946)
- * Quine, *Word and Object* (1960)
- * Lewis, *Convention* (1969)
- * Kripke, *Naming and Necessity* (1980)
- * Loar, *Mind and Meaning* (1981)
- * Evans, *The Varieties of Reference* (1982)
- * Salmon, *Frege’s Puzzle* (1986)
- * Neale, *Descriptions* (1990)
- * Hale and Wright, *A Companion to the Philosophy of Language* (1997)
- * Stroll, *Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy* (2000)
- * Soames, *Beyond Rigidity* (2002)