

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

CASEY O'CALLAGHAN

PHIL 235

Fall 2007

M, W, (F) 2:40–4p

o: 73 Campus Ave

w: www.bates.edu/~cocallag/

What is the mind? Nothing could be more obvious to me than that I have a mind. A rich mental life includes beliefs, hopes, memories, and experiences. But what is the nature of such mental states? Are they nothing more than states of my brain—something observable through the technologies of neuroscience? If mental states are manifested in ordinary physical stuff, could a sophisticated computer be intelligent? Have experiences? Possess a mind? Or does the mind involve something more, something subjective, ineffable, or inexplicably mysterious?

Texts

(PM) *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings*, ed. David J. Chalmers (OUP, 2002).

(L) Articles posted to Lyceum: lyceum.bates.edu

Coursework

1. Attendance, preparation, and participation are essential to your success in this class. Collectively, they are worth **1/5** of your grade.
2. Two short essays, due **F 9-28, W 11-14: 1/5 each**
3. Midterm quiz (**M 10-15**) and Final exam (**T 12-11, 1:15p**): **1/5 each**

Schedule

W 9-5 *Introduction: The Mind-Body Problem*

M 9-10 *Cartesian Dualism*

Descartes, *Meditations*, II, VI [PM, 1]

Smullyan, 'An Unfortunate Dualist' [PM, 4]

W 9-12 *Behaviorism*

Ryle, 'Descartes' Myth' [PM, 5]

M 9-17 *The Turing Test*

Turing, 'Computing Machinery and Intelligence' [L]

W 9-19 *Against Behaviorism*

Putnam, 'Brains and Behavior' [PM, 7]

- M 9-24 *Identity Theories*
Smart, 'Sensations and Brain Processes' [PM, 9]
- W 9-26 *Eliminative Materialism*
Feyerabend, 'Mental Events and the Brain' [L]
Quine, 'States of Mind' [L]
- F 9-28 **Essay #1 due**
- M 10-1 *Functionalism(s)*
Lewis, 'Mad Pain and Martian Pain' [L]
- W 10-3 Putnam, 'The Nature of Mental States' [PM, 11]
- M 10-8 *Critiques of Functionalism*
Block, 'Troubles with Functionalism' [PM, 14]
- W 10-10 Searle, 'Can Computers Think?' [PM, 63]
- M 10-15 **Midterm quiz**
— Fall recess, October 17–21
- M 10-22 *Consciousness and Subjectivity*
Nagel, 'Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness' [L]
- W 10-24 Nagel, 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat?' [PM, 25]
- M 10-29 *The Knowledge Argument*
Jackson, 'Epiphenomenal Qualia' [PM, 28]
- W 10-31 Lewis, 'What Experience Teaches' [PM, 29]
- M 11-5 *The Explanatory Gap*
Levine, 'Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap' [PM, 35]
- W 11-7 *Qualia, Transparency, and Intentionalism*
Harman, 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience' [L]
- M 11-12 *Mysterianism*
McGinn, 'Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?' [PM, 38]
- W 11-14 **Essay #2 due**
— Thanksgiving recess, November 17–25
- M 11-26 *Eliminativism*
Churchland, 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes' [PM, 53]
- W 11-28 *The Intentional Stance*
Dennett, 'True Believers' [PM, 52]
- M 12-3 Dennett, continued
- W 12-5 *Mind in World*
Clark and Chalmers, 'The Extended Mind' [PM, 59]
- T 12-11 **Final Exam, 1:15p**